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IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (10 Oct 67) FOR OT RD-670472

20 October 1967

AD 388893

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,  
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

**TO:** SEE DISTRIBUTION

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
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# OPERATIONAL — REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

11



THE

## BLACKHORSE REGIMENT

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
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11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257  
30 APRIL 1967

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FOREWORD

This Operational Report - Lessons Learned is the third submitted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment since its arrival in the Republic of Vietnam.

It has been prepared in accordance with AR 1-19 and covers the quarter 1 February 1967, thru 30 April 1967. Pertinent facts concerning the regiment's combat operations, civic action activities and base camp development during the quarter are included in this report.

  
ROY W. FARLEY  
Colonel, Armor  
Commanding

SECTION I

Significant Organization Activities

4

1. General
2. Personnel and Administration
3. Intelligence
4. Combat Operations
5. Training
6. Aviation
7. Logistics
8. Psychological Operations and Civic Action

SECTION II

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. Observations (Lessons Learned)
2. Recommendations

SECTION III

Inclosures

1. Roster of Commanders
- 2. PSYOPS Leaflets *Withdrawn at Hqs Dept of the Army*
3. Switchboard Diagram
- 4. Operation Junction City - *Withdrawn at Hqs Dept of the Army. To be published as FOROT RD 67X059*
- 5. Combat Photographs *Withdrawn at Hqs Dept of the Army*
- 6. Roster of Personnel Receiving Awards and Decorations - 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 *Withdrawn at Hqs Dept of the Army*

3

5

# CONFIDENTIAL

1. (U) General. The Blackhorse Regiment continued its unrelenting quest of the Viet Cong throughout the length and breath of the Third Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). With the departure of the 2nd Squadron on Operation OREGON, the Blackhorse made its debut in the First Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ).

The size and scope of combat operations involving the regiment increased markedly during the reporting period. Initially, limited operations (search and destroy, and convoy escort) were conducted in the Blackhorse TAO. Subsequent activities shifted to TAY NINH Province and WAR ZONE "C". Operation JUNCTION CITY, the sequel to Operation CEDAR FALLS, was initiated with the resolve to destroy the headquarters of the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) and its allied agencies. During the operation, lines of communication and fire support bases (FSB) were secured and extensive search and destroy operations conducted. Concurrently, one squadron joined the 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) in a search and destroy operation in PHOUC TUY Province. It was during this operation that General Creighton Abrams, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, once again observed the Blackhorse in action.

The second phase of JUNCTION CITY terminated in mid April to be followed closely by Operation MANHATTAN. Operation MANHATTAN was a multi division thrust into the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone, long the suspected headquarters of the IV Military Region. Attacking west from National Highway 13 along Axis Blackhorse, the regiment once again steered the methodical advance of the infantry in the search for the elusive enemy. The operation continued as the quarter ended.

The development of the Blackhorse Base Camp continues to progress on schedule. Perimeter defensive positions were 98% completed and all but four messhalls were finished. Attention is now being devoted to the building of administrative buildings and tactical command bunkers for the regimental headquarters and the subordinate commands.

Units of the 11th Armored Cavalry were continuously engaged in combat operations (89 days) against the Viet Cong. Operations varied from troop to regimental size during the quarter.

2. (C) Personnel and Administration.

a. General. During the quarter, the overall numerical strength of the regiment remained relatively constant; however, there was considerable personnel turbulence. This situation was created by an intensive infusion program conducted by the regiment during the period. The final results of the program can be termed good, since the regiment's DEROS hump was significantly reduced. In certain instances, inequities still exist; however these are primarily found within field grade officer positions where the individual's departure, regardless of when it occurs, will create considerable turbulence. The combat replacement situation remained good throughout the reporting period. Maintenance of morale was facilitated by improved postal service, increased stockage of PX semi-luxury items, greater availability of both in and out of country R&R allocations, the assignment of a four girl American Red Cross SRAO unit, and notification of approval of the regiment's request for a distinctive shoulder insignia. At the end of the reporting period, however, final approval of the exact specifications for the patch had not been made by the Institute of Heraldry.

b. Personnel.

(1) Strength. (Includes attachments)

|          | <u>AUTHORIZED</u> |           |           |            | <u>ASSIGNED</u> |           |           |            | <u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u> |           |           |            |
|----------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
|          | <u>OFF</u>        | <u>WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF</u>      | <u>WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF</u>              | <u>WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
| February | 208               | 59        | 3845      | 4119       | 226             | 37        | 4113      | 4376       | 214                     | 33        | 3991      | 4238       |
| March    | 208               | 59        | 3845      | 4112       | 222             | 36        | 4128      | 4386       | 217                     | 36        | 4004      | 4257       |
| April    | 208               | 59        | 3845      | 4112       | 217             | 37        | 4158      | 4412       | 213                     | 37        | 4072      | 4322       |

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Page 1 of 18 Pages

4  
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6

## (2) Losses. (Includes Attachments)

|                             | <u>KHA</u>    |           |            | <u>WHA</u>    |           |            | <u>DOW</u>    |           |            |
|-----------------------------|---------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------|------------|
|                             | <u>OFF/WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF/WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF/WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
| February                    | 1             | 10        | 11         | 4             | 101       | 105        | 1             | 2         | 3          |
| March                       | 0             | 10        | 10         | 5             | 206       | 211        | 0             | 1         | 1          |
| April                       | 1             | 10        | 11         | 5             | 78        | 83         | 0             | 0         | 0          |
| Totals for 2<br>the Quarter |               | 30        | 32         | 14            | 385       | 399        | 1             | 3         | 4          |

|                             | <u>NON-BATTLE DEAD</u> |           |            | <u>NON-BATTLE INJURY</u> |           |            | <u>ADMINISTRATIVE</u> |           |            |     |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-----------|------------|--------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------|-----|
|                             | <u>OFF/WO</u>          | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF/WO</u>            | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> | <u>OFF/WO</u>         | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |     |
| February                    | 0                      | 1         | 1          | 2                        | 13        | 15         | 9                     | 1         | 46         | 56  |
| March                       | 0                      | 1         | 1          | 0                        | 17        | 17         | 13                    | 1         | 95         | 109 |
| April                       | 0                      | 0         | 0          | 1                        | 14        | 15         | 18                    | 2         | 650        | 670 |
| Totals for 0<br>the Quarter |                        | 2         | 2          | 3                        | 44        | 47         | 40                    | 4         | 791        | 835 |

## (3) Gains. (Includes Attachments)

|                              | <u>OFF</u> | <u>WO</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
|------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| February                     | 3          | 183       | 189       |            |
| March                        | 7          | 135       | 144       |            |
| April                        | 19         | 616       | 637       |            |
| Totals<br>for the<br>Quarter | 29         | 7         | 934       | 970        |

### c. Services.

(1) Religious. During the reporting period, there were a total of 266 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 8,182. Generally, the Catholic services numbered one half of the number of Protestant; during the period, the month of March had almost half of the total services and attendees. Increased tactical operations during the first and last months account for reduced activity.

(2) Red Cross. During the three months, a total of 755 cases were handled, resulting in 101 persons departing on emergency leave. A Red Cross SRAO Clubmobile unit was established during the period, and a schedule of visits to units in the base camp and field locations was established. Morale of combat and support units has improved by a marked degree.

(3) Special Services. The Special Services program has been expanded to include a lending library and regularly scheduled first-run movies. Work has continued on construction in the Community Services Center Area.

(4) Postal. Most of the problems in this area have been resolved with the attachment of the 7th APU to the Blackhorse Regiment. Air Force support to deliver mail at forward locations has also improved greatly.

5

CONFIDENTIAL

7

d. **Morale.** Morale of the Blackhorse Regiment has continued to be excellent. Continued improvement of billets, construction of permanent messes, expanded recreational activities, increased stockage of semi-luxury items in the PX, Red Cross Clubmobile activities, and an aggressive R&R program have all been factors in maintaining the high morale of the Blackhorse Troopers. 1,556 individuals departed on cut-of-country R&R and 130 on in-country R&R. This is a substantial increase over the last quarter. Probably the greatest boost to morale was notification received in March that the regiment would be authorized a distinctive shoulder insignia. During the reporting period the finalized design was completed and all administrative steps were taken to secure specific approval from the Institute of Heraldry for the patch. At the end of the period approval had not yet been granted for the proposed shoulder patch, however, it is expected early in the next quarter.

e. **Information.** Throughout the quarter, information coverage increased. Seventy-nine representatives of various news media visited the regiment and 314 home town news releases were prepared. 114 home town tapes were recorded and eighty-two news releases dispatched; forty-two with photos.

f. **Post Exchange.** During the entire reporting period, the regimental exchange had total receipts of \$349,660.31, an increase of \$210,200.39 over the previous quarter. This increase occurred even though the regiment was on extended field operations and PX facilities of other base camps were utilized by personnel involved in the operations. Increased stockage of semi-luxury items such as tape recorders and television sets have accounted for much of the increase. Aggressive procurement actions should insure that sales remain at a high level.

g. **MOS Shortages.** High density MOS shortages were not experienced during the period. There were certain low-density shortages; however, in none of the cases was the combat readiness of the regiment impaired.

h. **Quality of Replacements.** Quality of replacements remained good, despite the increased infusion program. Incidents of enlisted personnel reporting in with adverse information in their 201 files decreased somewhat. The training level of all replacements appears to be acceptable.

i. **Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.**

(1) **Courts Martial.** During the quarter, the regiment processed the following courts-martial, by type:

| <u>GENERAL</u> | <u>SPECIAL</u> | <u>SUMMARY</u> |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1              | 19             | 16             |

(2) **Serious Incidents.** There were a total of seven serious incidents and accidents reported.

j. **Personnel Problem Areas.** The primary personnel problem area confronting the regiment during this quarter has been maintaining the regiment's officer strength. This problem more appropriately defines itself into two areas: replacement of unprogrammed losses and proper requisitioning of replacements for departing personnel. Experience has indicated that armor company grade officer replacements are extremely few and far between. Therefore, combat casualties will not be replaced by the current replacement system for approximately two months after the individual is KHA, WHA, or medically evacuated. This difficulty, when added to branch detail terminations, created a generally poor junior officer posture throughout the quarter. The future picture, that involving replacements for officers departing for DEROS, does not appear much better. Curtailment of officers programmed for attendance at the Armor Officers Career Course was not offset by sufficiently advanced reporting dates of replacements. This will create a shortage of great criticality during the time (July - August 1967) when the regiment will be short approximately thirty-five officers, in addition to combat losses which may not have been replaced by that date. The end result pertends for an officer strength posture in which some line units may be faced with only 50% officer strength during mid summer. At the end of the reporting period, steps had been initiated to either eliminate or at least reduce these problems.

3. (C) Intelligence

a. VC Activity. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued to operate at will within the once impenetrable VC base areas during the quarter. Three major operations took the Blackhorse Regiment into the very heart of VC dominated areas in WAR ZONE "C", the Michelin Plantation and the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone. During these and other operations, the VC reacted with sporadic defense and harassment, with only two company size contacts during the quarter. To counter the relentless pressure of the armored thrusts of the Blackhorse, the VC employed mines and RIG-2/recoilless fire in increasing strength. Outside of operational areas, the VC conducted a claymore and grenade attack on the convoy staging area near LONG BINH (17 April 1967) as a part of their counter-sweep program. During the period, there were seventy-three mining incidents forty-nine cases of small arms and twenty-seven of automatic weapons fire, thirty-seven instances of recoilless rifle or RPG-2 rocket launcher fire, seven cases of rifle grenade employment, ten claymore incidents, four mortar attacks, and fifty-seven accounts of aircraft receiving small arms or automatic weapons fire. Despite the increased number of VC initiated incidents, the regiment suffered only light personnel casualties and vehicle damage.

(1) During Operations MUNCIE and JUNCTION CITY I, the VC employed large numbers of mines. Along Inter-Provincial Route 2, south of CAM MY in the "Slope 30" area (vicinity YS4682), the VC have almost exclusively used the US MIAI AT Mine, sometimes boosted by placing extra TNT beneath it. The VC continually mine this stretch of road in an attempt to protect their east-west communications/liaison and supply routes between the HAT DICH and MAY TAO base areas. During JUNCTION CITY I, the VC also employed numerous mines, most frequently encountered in areas which, because of vegetation or relief, canalized mechanized movement. Wooden box mines were found, in addition to metallic antitank mines, for the first time by the regiment. However, the VC were more concerned with mine fabrication than detection as they used enough metal (nails and wire) to be detected by mine detectors. Most of these locally fabricated mines used CBU bomblets as detonators which also aided in their discovery. The first truncated shaped-charge command detonated mine was encountered along Highway 13 during JUNCTION CITY II. This mine contained sufficient explosives to blow an ACAV into the air and over on its top (10 April 1967). The frequency with which mines have been encountered indicated the VC appreciate their value in delaying movement and inflicting casualties, thereby reducing their casualties resulting from direct confrontation with mechanized units.

(2) During JUNCTION CITY I, much of the defense of VC installations was conducted by small, provisional units formed of personnel of various COSVN units and sections with only two instances of main force elements being contacted (70th VC Regiment and 271st VC Regiment.) During the operation, the VC continued to operate from supply caches and bases as evidenced by the lack of significant numbers of prepared rice balls found on bodies which are normally carried by mobile troops. The operation did show the VC are aware of armored forces' capability to operate in the difficult terrain of their base areas as noted by the frequency of RPG-2 and HEAT rifle grenade fire. There was, however, a significant lack of recoilless rifles normally found in main force units.

(3) JUNCTION CITY II found the VC merely harassing the regiment's security forces with only one major contact (elements of 273d Regiment) being made and that with a platoon reinforced with a recoilless rifle (11 April 1967). The VC again harassed and lightly defended his supply caches and base camps during Operation MANHATTAN. One major contact was made with a company-sized unit (C64 Local Force Company) during the move to cordon and search AF 14 CHANH (XT5554) on 29 April 1967. Documents from bodies during the operation have identified elements of Group 83 and other COSVN Rear Service Groups. The operation is significant in the number of VC PWs captured, indicating the speed and violence of the regiment's maneuver. Cordon and search operations in the Michelin Plantation resulted in eighteen PWs taken, including an NVA lieutenant and prisoners from the C64 Local Force Company. Since the VC have moved with relative impunity in the plantation, these operations caught him unaware. He employed mines in the plantation, but by following routes used by local traffic, they proved no obstacle to the regiment.

## b. VC Losses:

(1) Personnel: 147 KIA (BC), 16 KBA (BC), 48 KIA (POSS), 32 KBA (POSS), 28 PWs, 3 Ralliers, 92 Detainees.

(2) Weapons and Ammunition: CHICOM Type 24 HMG - 3, RPG-2 rocket Launchers - 3 SMGs - 18, carbines, - 32, rifles - 92, pistol - 1, claymores - 40,

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grenades - 248, AT mines - 109, case or Comp C3, 60 pounds AT, 60mm mortar rounds 109, 81mm mortar rounds - 10, 250 pound bombs - 8, 500 pound bomb - 1, artillery rounds - 176, CBU bomblets - 84.

(3) Foodstuffs: 224.31 tons rice, 2.8 tons salt.

(4) Miscellaneous: 581 pounds documents, 999 pounds medical supplies, 610 pounds clothing, 30 bicycles, CHICOM 102# radio, switchboard, 2 telephones, 2 commercial radios, radio and generator parts, generator, 2 KOHLER engines, 2 printing presses (1 Chinese and the other Japanese), rifle scope, 91 wooden training rifles, 7 typewriters, mimeograph machine, 4 sewing machines, US protective mask, 3 VC gas masks, sampan, 3 oxcarts, record player, 2 rice mills, motorcycle, 100 pounds carbon paper, 488 structures, 1717 fortifications.

### c. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: A study was conducted of 104 facilities found during Operation JUNCTION CITY I (22 February - 15 March 1967) in WAR ZONE "C", sixty-nine being discovered in the first operational area and thirty-five in the second. These facilities included fortifications, base areas, training areas, food caches, and miscellaneous ordnance, signal and medical installations. A comparison of each of these locations with all previously reported intelligence information, principally the VC Installation List from 1st Infantry Division DPU, shows that 29 of 69 and 11 of 35 fell within 500m of a reported installation or 42.1% and 31.4% respectively. The overall average was 40 out of 104, or 38.5% with the average error 132m (E-W) by 178m (N-S) or a 225m radial error. The correlation between reported and discovered installations is not nearly as apparent as during Operation CEDAR FALLS where 88.1% of these facilities fell within 500m of a reported installation. Much of this can be attributed to the lack of sufficient detailed reports on WAR ZONE "C" as well as the nature of the terrain which undoubtedly prevented units from readily uncovering installations without a thorough, time consuming search. The correlation is still high enough to warrant detailed consideration of the VC Installation List when targeting for or searching during an operation.

(2) Red Haze: Red Haze still proves useful in detecting VC groupings and base/rest areas. There has been a noticeable lack of significant returns in the Blackhorse TAOR during the quarter, possibly indicating the VC have altered cooking hours. 1st Infantry Division has been running Red Haze in the late afternoon and early morning during reported cooking hours. This time frame may prove useful to the regiment and will be tried in the future. During the quarter, few Red Haze missions were run during operations because of conflict with artillery.

(3) SLAR: During the quarter, SLAR missions were run practically every night during JUNCTION CITY II and MANHATTAN by the 1st Infantry Division. Inflight readouts were broadcast to be monitored by brigades and the regiment. Artillery could then be fired on the targets by units within their areas of operation within minutes after detection. This organized SLAR capability greatly enhanced the intelligence gathering process for the regiment.

(4) Photographs: With the acquisition of a hand-held camera with telephoto lens during the quarter, the regiment now possesses the capability of having spot photography of areas of interest within a matter of hours. 1st Infantry Division organic aerial photographic capability provided rapid response to operational and intelligence requirements of the regiment during Operations JUNCTION CITY II and MANHATTAN.

(5) PWs and Documents: Rapid interrogation and dissemination of PW information aided in the identification and location of enemy units and facilities. Ralliers, when used within areas with which they are familiar, proved useful and profitable in locating VC installations and facilities. Documents captured have proved more useful in strategic intelligence than tactical, but their value as sources of information is generally reliable.

(6) Agent Reports: Those reports still constitute the bulk of intelligence reports received by the regiment. The majority of these reports are of doubtful value unless corroborated by other intelligence sources.

### 4. (C) Combat Operations. ✓

#### a. General.

(1) February. Following the termination of the multi division operation, CEDAR FALLS in late January, action was relatively light for the Blackhorse. The 3rd Squadron provided Cavalry support for elements of the 9th Infantry Division on Operations COLEY and IOLA. Operation MUNCIE was also reinitiated at the beginning of the month with the 3rd Squadron conducting search and destroy op-

CONFIDENTIAL

8

Page 5 of 18 Pages

## CONFIDENTIAL

operations and providing security for engineer work parties along Interprovincial Route 2 south of the base camp. Contact was sporadic with no determined resistance encountered; however, numerous vehicles were either destroyed or damaged by mines along with an increased use of antitank weapons (240's). In spite of this vehicular damage, casualties resulting from the anti-tank weapons remained light. 2nd Squadron continued to provide base camp security as well as securing engineer crews clearing the heavy undergrowth along each side of National Highway 1 from COUI CAT to GIA RAY (site of 2 December 66 ambush.)

The 1st Squadron on the first of the month road marched to the LAI THI-TINH area to support the 1st Infantry Division during Operation. During the operation, they provided area security, secured essential lines of communications and conducted search and destroy operations. On the twelfth of the month, the troopers of the 1st Squadron returned to the base camp after release by the 1st Infantry Division.

Time in the base camp was short for the men of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons as they departed with regimental headquarters to lead another multi division operation into the hinterland of Viet Cong activities in the III CTZ, WAR ZONE "C". Operation JUNCTION CITY (See Inclosure 5) was the largest US effort of the Vietnamese conflict to date with the first phase terminating a month later.

(2) March. Following a two day pause for maintenance the troopers of the 1st Squadron mounted up and moved south to collaborate on Operation PORTSEA with the 1st ATF. While the First was busy to the south the 2nd Squadron was preparing to move out on the second phase of JUNCTION CITY under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. On the twentieth, the Second Set out for the QUON LOI - AN LOC area to secure fire support bases for the 1st Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade artillery. In addition, the squadron opened lines of communications in its area of operation. The 3rd Squadron continued to secure the base camp, provide convoy escorts and prepare for participation in JUNCTION CITY II.

(3) April. April proved to be a busy month for the Blackhorse. Regimental headquarters and the 3rd Squadron moved out for BINH DUONG Province to join the 2nd Squadron on the second phase of Operation Junction City in the eastern portion of WAR ZONE "C". On 3 April, two days later, the regimental base camp was subjected to a mortar and recoilless rifle attack lasting approximately 30 minutes and resulting in light casualties and equipment damaged (one US KHA, twelve US WHA; three UH-1C, one O-1 damaged). Counter mortar fire was delivered with unknown results. However, an ensuing search of the area revealed two 60mm and two 81mm mortar positions and three 75mm recoilless rifle positions. An estimated 200 rounds fell in the base camp area, primarily in the 3rd Squadron and airfield areas.

The regiment (-) was placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division for the second phase of JUNCTION CITY. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons conducted search and destroy, route security and convoy escort operations in their assigned sectors between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. Enemy contact was light with the 3rd Squadron encountering elements of the 273rd VC Regiment. On 15 April, the operation terminated and the 1st and 2nd squadrons exchanged locations to enable the 2nd Squadron to prepare for its impending move north as part of Task Force OREGON.

On 17 April, the regiment's convoy staging location in LONG BINH was attacked by an unknown size enemy force using claymore mines, small arms, hand grenades and rifle grenades, resulting in four US KHA and twenty US WHA. No fire was returned due to the close proximity of other friendly military and civilian elements in the area.

Operation MANHATTAN commenced on 23 April with the regiment remaining under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons lead the multi-division offense making hasty river crossings of the THI TINH River, into the western portion of the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone, located south of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Long known to be impregnated with mines and honey-combed with tunnels, the regiment's casualties have remained relatively light as has the contact. The operation continues as the reporting period ends.

In the absence of the regiment, security of the base camp is being provided principally by the tenant units and the rear detachment of the regiment. Additional combat support is being rendered by the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry from the 9th Infantry Division stationed at BEAR CAT.

CONFIDENTIAL 9

Page 6 of 18 Pages

# CONFIDENTIAL

## b. Engineer Activities.

(1) Base Camp Development. Progress on the base camp continued to move on schedule in spite of the continuous syphoning off of engineer resources during the quarter. The 27th Engineer Battalion (C) along with elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) continued to provide the engineer assets necessary for the development of the base camp.

Perimeter defenses were completed to include nine fighting towers, and sixty-six bunkers. The taxiway was brought to a 98% completion stage as well as the 7th Surgical Hospital. By the end of the quarter, 85% of the permanent structures, messhalls, latrines and showers had been completed. Pouring of concrete slabs for administrative buildings (Post Exchange, Regimental Headquarters, TOC Bunker) had commenced. BOC facilities for the regimental headquarters are 60% completed, requiring only interior work to be ready for occupancy. As the monsoon season approaches, priority of effort shifted to the camp's drainage system. As larger culverts became available they are being used to replace existing smaller ones; at the present time the system is 85% completed.

An operational ice plant will be realized shortly after the close of the reporting period. Coupled with the ice plant three water wells have been drilled and capped to later provide water for the hospital and the squadrons. Water continues to be provided by a spring fed lake constructed during the last quarter. During this quarter over 3,405,000 gallons of potable water were consumed; of this total 1,210,000 gallons in February, 895,000 gallons in March and 1,300,000 gallons in April.

(2) Combat Support. Combat engineer support for the regiment was provided principally by the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) with limited assistance provided by the 27th Engineer Battalion (C).

During the initial days of February, elements of the 919th Engineer Company operated south of the base camp with the 3rd Squadron on Operation IOLA. While on the operation which terminated on 4 February, one regimental sized base camp, consisting of approximately 300 fortified bunkers was destroyed. In addition, an expedition bridge was constructed enabling the tanks of the 3rd Squadron to continue their mission.

Following IOLA was Operation MUNCIE which consisted of search and destroy operations in the TAOR. Working with elements of the 27th Engineer Battalion (C), extensive road clearing operations utilizing Rome plows were carried out along National Highway One in the vicinity of the 2 December ambush. More pressing combat requirements precluded the completion of the project. Limited road repairs were also made along Interprovincial Route 2 in the CAM MY area. Numerous mines were encountered by the regiment's maneuver elements, requiring their removal and/or destruction in place. A total of nine Soviet type mines and three US M1A1 type mines were destroyed.

In the middle of February combat support shifted to Operation JUNCTION CITY. During the two phases of the multi division operation, the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) provided the regiment close combat engineer support by constructing crossing fords, detecting and destroying enemy mines and booby traps of every conceivable size and shape. Field fortifications destroyed included 200 meters of tunnel complexes, 275 bunkers, seven water wells, and eleven structures. During the operation 10,000 pounds of explosives and four miles of detnating cord were expended.

Following Operation JUNCTION CITY the 1st Squadron in cooperation with the 1st Australian Task Force participated in Operation PORTSEA, during which elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) constructed two crossing fords and destroyed 200 meters of tunnel complexes and five mines.

Upon the termination of Operation JUNCTION CITY the engineers, one week later, were engaged in Operation MANHATTAN which is still in progress. During the operation to date, the company has removed a class 60 bridge to allow for the emplacement of an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge, destroyed approximately two hundred (200) fortified bunkers, seventeen huts and one punjii pit.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## c. Chemical Activities.

(1) Base Camp Defoliation and Clearing. The chemical section defoliated eight hectares of the perimeter around the base camp. Herbicide agent white was used mixed with 45 gallons of water to 5 gallons of agent white. 1200 gallons of herbicide agent white were used during this reporting period.

(2) Combat Operations. During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, Air Cavalry Troop employed four EL59 CS cluster (Riot Control Agent) in support of 1st Squadron operations. The EL59 (Riot Control Agent) CS clusters were dropped on a suspected VC company base camp prior to exploration by elements of the 1st Squadron. No conclusive reports could be ascertained as to the overall effects of Riot Control Agent CS on enemy personnel since most of the agent was upwind of the target area.

## d. Signal Activities.

(1) During the period February through April, the regiment participated in three major operations in which Signal activities were varied and received a test under combat operations. Organic communications equipment was fully utilized during the aforementioned period and was augmented by equipment and personnel from higher headquarters.

(2) While participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY I, a PFL451 battery charger was obtained to be used as a rectifier. This piece of equipment eliminated the use of several small 4.5 KW generators and provided the capability of using one 10 KW generator to supply power for FM equipment and lights in the regimental TOC. All VHF support during JUNCTION CITY I was received from the 125th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry Division. Base camp AM-RATT support as well as forward command post message center support was provided by the 53rd Signal Battalion.

(3) From 1 April through 15 April the regiment participated in JUNCTION CITY II. During this operation VHF support was obtained from the 121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. Again, base camp AM-RATT support and forward command post message center support were provided by the 53rd Signal Battalion. A 60 foot antenna mast was obtained from the 121st Signal Battalion, thus providing a capability of raising four RC-292 antennas above surrounding tree growth, allowing the regimental command post to be located in a covered, rather than an open area.

(4) The regiment continues to participate in Operation MANHATTAN as the quarter ends. Communication support continues to be received from the 121st Signal Battalion and the 53rd Signal Battalion. As the regiment moved to a forward command post location near DAU TIENG, VHF support consisted of an AN/MRC-69 and an AN/MRC-112, providing a backup and alternate routing capability for critical circuits. Again the 60 foot antenna mast was very useful in that the command post was located in a rubber plantation, thus making it necessary to erect the RC-292 antennas above the trees.

(5) In general, the communications support provided the regiment by the 125th Signal Battalion and the 121st Signal Battalion materially assisted the regiment in accomplishing its combat missions.

(6) The change of the direct support maintenance battalion from the 188th to the 185th has caused problems in the filling of requisitions thus necessitating rerequisitioning of many communications items, for example, antenna sections. This has produced a delay in acquiring needed communications parts and equipment.

## e. Support.

### (1) Air Force.

(a) General. During this period construction on the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) facilities at LONG GIAO have progressed rather slowly due to operational commitments requiring the deployment of TACP personnel to forward operating locations. Four buildings (20 X 40) are presently about 75% complete. Upon completion, these buildings will comprise the living quarters and the administrative office for the TACP. The concrete foundations for these buildings were

CONFIDENTIAL

set by the Army Engineers, however most of the other materials (sheet metal, lumber, and wire screening) were procured by the TACP personnel through Air Force supply channels at Bien Hoa. Engineer technical personnel from Bien Hoa Air Base were also provided to assist in constructing the buildings. The majority of the construction, however, was performed by Air Force personnel. The airstrip is now usable for the O-1 type aircraft assigned the unit and is used during the day. Movement of the aircraft and pilots to the base camp on a permanent basis cannot be done until a suitably reveted parking area is completed. One aircraft of the unit was at LONG GIAO on the night of 3 April 1967 when a mortar attack took place. The aircraft, not protected by the required revetment, sustained combat damage. O-1 aircraft are in extremely short supply in Vietnam and are not replaceable, therefore the O-1 aircraft of the unit will not be able to remain overnight at the at the base camp until suitable facilities are completed.

(b) Resources.

1 Aircraft: The unit is assigned three US Air Force O-1G aircraft. One aircraft sustained combat damage in the mortar attack at LONG GIAO on 3 April 1967. The aircraft was repaired and operational the following day.

2 Personnel: This quarter has seen several personnel changes in the unit.

a Officer: Present manning calls for one Air Liaison Officer, Tactical Air Control Party Commander and five Forward Air Controllers. This manning level has been maintained throughout the period.

b Enlisted: Present enlisted personnel manning consists of a Non-Commissioned Officer in charge, six Radio Maintenance Repairman/Operators and one Ground Power Repairman. These personnel maintain and operate the six AN/MRC-107 radio vehicles assigned the unit.

(c) Operations. During this period several major operations were participated in. Most of them had the regiment under the operational control of either the 1st Infantry Division or the 25th Infantry Division. On these occasions all 11th Armored Cavalry TACP operations required close coordination with the controlling headquarters, both before and during the operation. FAC's and the O-1 aircraft were deployed to forward operating bases so that maximum coverage could be provided the units in the field.

(d) Problem Areas.

1 FM communications continues to be a problem area, however this should be resolved in June when new series radios are scheduled for installation in the O-1 aircraft.

2 Flight Facilities: The main operating base for the O-1 aircraft and the FAC's continues to be BIEN HOA due to the lack of revetted parking facilities at LONG GIAO.

STATISTICAL DATA ON AIR FORCE SUPPORT FEBRUARY - APRIL 1967

| <u>OBJECTIVE</u>      | <u>SORTIES FLOWN</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Visual Reconnaissance | 173                  |
| Forward Air Control   | 166                  |
| Convoy Escort         | 134                  |
| Artillery Adjustment  | 13                   |
| Administrative        | 1                    |
| Maintenance           | 13                   |
| Combat Strikes        | 559                  |

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TYPE  
F-100

12

Page 9 of 18 Pages

CONFIDENTIAL

14

TYPE AIRCRAFT FLOWN

| Type    | F-4 | F-5 | F-100 | B-57 | AC-47 | O-1 |
|---------|-----|-----|-------|------|-------|-----|
| Sorties | 72  | 63  | 357   | 58   | 9     | 500 |

TOTAL FLYING TIME O-1 AIRCRAFT

1125:20

ORDNANCE EXPENDED

|                          |                  |        |
|--------------------------|------------------|--------|
| MK 65                    | 1000# Bomb       | 22     |
| MK 117                   | 750# Bomb        | 663    |
| MK 82                    | 500# Bomb        | 679    |
| MK 81                    | 250# Bomb        | 50     |
| BLU-3 or BLU-27          | 750# Napalm Bomb | 922    |
| CEU Canisters (All Type) |                  | 12     |
| LAU-3 RK Pods            | (19 2.75 Rx) Pod | 109    |
| Flares                   |                  | 380    |
| 20mm                     | Rounds           | 85,020 |
| 50 Cal                   | Rounds           | 6,200  |
| 7.62mm                   | Rounds           | 67,500 |

(2) Artillery.

(a) General: Artillery fire support provided during the quarter assumed two principal roles: One, the delivery of harassing and interdiction (H&I) fire, and second, in support of ground operations and engagement of known or suspected Viet Cong positions. The organic howitzer batteries provided direct support for the squadrons with reinforcing fires provided by the 54th Artillery Group for operations in the Blackhorse Task. On operations such as JUNCTION CITY I and II, and MANHATTAN, reinforcing fires were provided by the division general support artillery battalion or elements of the 23rd and 54th Artillery Groups.

(b) During the month of February the regiment conducted transition training for the M109, 155mm SP howitzers. The transition was effected without serious impact on operational requirements. Assistance from technical representatives of the 1st Logistical Command reduced the frequency of maintenance problems on the hydraulic systems of the M109. The added range over the M108, 105mm SP, allowed the howitzer batteries to support maneuver elements without frequent displacements.

(c) Employment and Combat Operations.

1 During Operations MUNCIE, KITTYHAWK, and WILLISTON, which were squadron sized operations, the howitzer batteries remained in direct support of parent squadrons.

2 During Operation JUNCTION CITY I, the regiment established a provisional artillery battalion headquarters, consisting of personnel from the 54th Artillery Group and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Task Force Artillery consisting of Howitzer Batteries, 1st and 3rd Squadrons, and Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery (155mm SP) initially supported regimental operations from FSB BRAVO, vicinity XT268777. As the armor thrust through the heart of WAR ZONE "C" progressed north, Task Force Artillery (-) with the howitzer batteries displaced to FSB 6 vicinity XT273964 on 27 February 1967. As the mission of the regiment was changed to conduct search and destroy operations in the western most Area of WAR ZONE "C" (the "Elephants Ear"), Task Force Artillery again displaced to establish a fire support base, vicinity XT038793, with Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) and Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery (8in SP)

CONFIDENTIAL 13

# CONFIDENTIAL

15- providing general support reinforcing fires. As a provisional control headquarters for artillery support in the regiment, Task Force Artillery was an initial and successful venture in its responsiveness of fires to the needs of the supported maneuver elements;

2 During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, the scope of regimental operations was to clear and secure National Highway 13 in sector and to escort logistical convoys between LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. Under attachment to 1st Infantry Division, the regiment received the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery in direct support of route security operations. Fire support bases were established at the following locations: BAN BANG, vicinity XT788458, BAU LONG, vicinity XT793343, CHON THANH, vicinity XT768623, DUTCHMAN'S, vicinity XT735817, and QUAN LOI, vicinity XT821906. These bases provided mutual reinforcing fires throughout the entire sector of operations. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8in/175mm SP) provided general support fires to Task Force Artillery.

4 During Operation MANHATTEN, which commenced 23 April, 1st and 3rd Squadrons attacked west from National Highway 13 along Axis Blackhorse into the western sector of the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone south of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. In order to provide adequate artillery coverage for the attacking forces, Howitzer Batteries, 1st and 3rd Squadrons, were pre-positioned prior to D-Day at FSB OSCAR vicinity XT544451. 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (-) provided initial support to 1st and 3rd Squadrons from LAI KHE, vicinity XT770375. Coordination of fire was effected through communications with other units occupying FSB OSCAR: 2nd Battalion, 33rd Artillery (-) and 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (-) of the 1st Infantry Division. Clearance of fire was the responsibility of each squadron ASCOORD; no central agency for the coordination of fire within the regiment and with units adjacent to the Blackhorse area of operations was established.

## (d) Ordnance Expended:

### FEBRUARY

|  |       |
|--|-------|
| Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron . . . . . | 3,486 |
| Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron . . . . . | 1,047 |
| Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron . . . . . | 4,256 |
| Total . . . . .                          | 8,789 |

### MARCH

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron . . . . . | 5,050  |
| Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron . . . . . | 3,830  |
| Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron . . . . . | 6,079  |
| Total . . . . .                          | 14,959 |

### APRIL

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron . . . . . | 4,362  |
| Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron . . . . . | 2,189  |
| Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron . . . . . | 9,253  |
| Total . . . . .                          | 15,804 |

Total rounds expended for the quarter . . . . . 39,552

## 5. (U) Training.

a. Individual: The quality of the replacements arriving in the regiment as pertain to training was good. There were no particular weaknesses noted in specific areas of training.

b. Unit: There was no formal unit training conducted by the regiment during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL age 11 of 18 Pages

14

# CONFIDENTIAL

c. Specialized: In February the 54th Artillery Group conducted training on the M109 Self Propelled Howitzer, as the M108 was being replaced by the heavier M109 within the regiment. The next month, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was organized from elements of the Aero Rifle Platoon in the Air Cavalry Troop. Liaison and training visits were made to other similar units in-country, and intensified training in radiotelephone procedures, map reading, scouting, patrolling and first aid was initiated for members of the unit. Additionally, three patrol members were sent to the MACV Recondo School in April.

d. Organization for training: The only organization for training is the replacement training school, consisting of six combat experienced Non-Commissioned Officers. Every replacement to the regiment is given five and one half days of training covering all required MACV subjects and specialized subjects unique to the Blackhorse Regiment. These include armored cavalry tactics and Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle orientation and weapons firing. Numbers of individuals trained in the Blackhorse Replacement Training School for the quarter are as follows:

|                           |     |
|---------------------------|-----|
| <u>FEBRUARY</u> . . . . . | 101 |
| <u>MARCH</u> . . . . .    | 123 |
| <u>APRIL</u> . . . . .    | 110 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> . . . . .    | 334 |

6. (U) Aviation.

a. General: Army Aviation elements supported the regiment with 16 OH-23's, 19 UH-1C's and 12 UH-1D's. The primary use of the observation helicopters was for command and control missions in support of the regiment and subordinate units. Aerial fire support and rapid reaction forces were provided by the UH-1C type helicopter (gunships). Emergency aerial resupply and casualty evacuation was accomplished by the UH-1D. Aviation statistics are listed below:

SORTIES FLOWN

|       | Command & Control | Troop Lift | Cargo Lft | Casualty Evacuation |
|-------|-------------------|------------|-----------|---------------------|
| OH-23 | 3,396             | -----      | -----     | -----               |
| UH-1D | 718               | 1,243      | 2,005     | 67                  |

SORTIES FLOWN

|       | Aerial Fire Support and Reaction Force | Administration | Reconnaissance |
|-------|--|----------------|----------------|
| OH-23 |  | 1,377          | 5,813          |
| UH-1C |  |                | 382            |
| UH-1D | 1,405                                  | 1,039          | 132            |

|       | Number of Passengers | Tons Cargo | Hours Flown | Fuel Consumed (gal) |
|-------|----------------------|------------|-------------|---------------------|
| OH-23 | 3,326                |            | 3,260       | 55,420              |
| UH-10 |                      |            | 1,199       | 116,220             |
| UH-1D | 6,723                | 24         | 1,937       | 71,940              |

These results were achieved by use of resources organic to the regimental aviation platoon, the squadron aviation sections and the air cavalry troop.

In March, 1967, a new capability was added to the Air Cavalry Troop with the organization of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), which performed five patrols during this period.

# CONFIDENTIAL

17 b. Employment: The observation helicopters were utilized mainly for command and control, reconnaissance, and fire adjustment at squadron level.

The UH-1C gunships were employed in aerial fire support, as a rapid reaction force and in reconnaissance missions.

| <u>Results of fire</u> | February | March | April | Total |
|------------------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|
| VC Killed Confirmed    | 0        | 6     | 2     | 8     |
| VC killed Possible     | 0        | 3     | 8     | 11    |
| VC Captured            | 0        | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Structures Destroyed   | 6        | 20    | 4     | 30    |
| Structures Damaged     | 6        | 5     | 21    | 29    |

#### Ammunition Consumed for the Quarter

7.62 516,800

2.75 3,599

40mm 12,445

UH-1D aircraft were principally utilized for troop lift, cargo lift, medical evacuation, speaker and leaflet drop, administrative and liaison, and command and control. Due to the UH-1D's greater sophistication in instrumentation over the OH-23, night and marginal weather command and control, and liaison missions were flown in the UH-1D.

c. Techniques: The Observation Helicopter (OH-23) provided an aerial platform from which squadron commanders effectively directed their maneuver elements, which greatly enhanced the mobility inherent to these organizations. The UH-1C gunships were effective as a quick reaction force for containing the enemy.

A main area of concern has been keeping the maximum number of aircraft flyable. It was learned in earlier operations that the continuing effectiveness of the aviation elements was adversely effected when the maintenance crews were deployed into the forward areas. Most organizational maintenance is performed at night. Effective maintenance is hindered by blackout conditions and other related and necessary security precautions. The aircraft, when concentrated in tactical positions, were not only vulnerable but presented lucrative targets to the enemy. This was corrected by positioning the bulk of the aircraft at the nearest established airfield. This technique not only vulnerable but presented lucrative targets to the enemy. This was corrected by positioning the bulk of the aircraft at the nearest established airfield. This technique not only increased the availability of aircraft, it decreased the area of security required by the regiment, with no appreciable degradation in the support rendered. This technique has also eased the burden of resupply (Class III-A & V-A) by utilizing an area that is more easily reached by normal supply channels, therefore releasing armored convoy escort vehicles and/or CH-47 helicopters for use in the forward areas.

d. Maintenance: The posture has been continually improving as maintenance facilities become available mainly through the individual efforts of maintenance personnel. It is of interest to note that it is possible to maintain an operational maintenance posture while concurrently constructing semi-permanent facilities using only the organic maintenance personnel of both the Air Cavalry Troop and the Regimental Aviation Platoon.

Aircraft availability - (expressed in percent of assigned aircraft):

16 915

Page 13 of 18 Pages

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

|                | OH-23 | UH-1C | UH-1D |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| February       | 66    | 77    | 84    |
| March          | 77    | 85    | 89    |
| April          | 80    | 91    | 72    |
| <u>Average</u> | 74    | 84    | 82    |

Aircraft declined for maintenance (expressed in percent of assigned aircraft):

|          | OH-23 | UH-1C | UH-1D |
|----------|-------|-------|-------|
| February | 34    | 23    | 16    |
| March    | 23    | 15    | 11    |
| April    | 20    | 9     | 28*   |
| Average  | 26**  | 16    | 18    |

\* The unusually high maintenance down-time for April on UH-1D model aircraft is the result of a special inspection requirement which was received through maintenance channels. This inspection involved the complete removal of the tail boom by direct support maintenance and the replacement of worn and cracked fittings. This inspection was at the time, unscheduled. It has since been incorporated as a regular inspection at 300 hour intervals. As a scheduled inspection it can be anticipated and therefore staggered in the normal manner for such inspections.

\*\*The high maintenance down time on the OH-23's has been caused by repeated generator losses and down time awaiting replacement items.

## 7. (U) Logistics.

a. General: The regiment was adequately supported during the reporting period by the 29th General Support Group in base camp and by 1st Logistical Command establishing forward supply areas during field tactical operations.

### b. Supply and Maintenance.

(1) Class I. Class I support was adequate during the reporting period.

(2) Class II/IV (Less PLL). Class II and IV support improved during the reporting period due to the formalization of the stock record accounting at the 506th Supply and Service Forward Supply Point located in the regimental base camp.

(3) Class III and IIIA. Support rendered by the 64th QM Battalion and the FSP continued to be rendered in an outstanding manner. No problems have been encountered.

(4) Class V. Support received from the 3d Ordnance Battalion ASP has been adequate. Ammunition types under available supply rate restriction have been reduced during the quarter.

(5) Maintenance. Maintenance support during the quarter has been erratic, unpredictable and unresponsive. Maintenance support was provided by the 188th Maintenance Battalion until they were alerted for Operation OREGON. During the month of April, the regiment received only marginal support from the 188th Maintenance Battalion due to their preoccupation with and stand down for Operation OREGON. Upon deployment, the 188th Maintenance Battalion carried with them their AT Code, the NCR-500 machine records system and 1900 outstanding requisitions for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The maintenance support mission of the regiment was assumed by the 185th Maintenance Battalion which has provided excellent support since assuming the mission, however the maintenance posture of the regiment was irreparably damaged by the loss of the AT Code and 1900 outstanding requisitions and the change from a machine records to a manual requisition system

17

Page 14 of 18 Pages

# CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

19  
c. Transportation. Transportation support has been provided on an as required/when available basis by the Saigon Transportation Office. Primarily organic transportation has been utilized. Response to the requests of the regiment has resulted in negligible support.

d. Services. Services support has been adequate except for support contracted from P&E. P&E representatives in the XUAN LOC area continue to be indifferent to their contractual responsibilities to support the regiment. As a result the regiment must devote combat manpower to supervising garbage pickup and disposal activities, insect and rodent control, generator operation and power distribution activities, roads, grounds and building maintenance.

e. Medical.

(1) General. Medical activities during the quarter deal primarily with treatment of diseases - specifically skin diseases and upper respiratory tract infections. Non battle injuries were numerous but minor in nature. Injuries due to hostile action were primarily due to fragment wounds in the lower extremities of the body (below the hips). However, the majority of these cases were back for duty in 3 to 4 weeks. Very few cases of chest injuries were found which is attributed to the fact that all troopers wear the flack vests, which stop many of the fragments. For the most part the IRMA were initially treated by the squadron medical personnel and from there air evacuated, mostly by organic helicopters, to a fixed medical facility. Approximately 25% of the cases treated were returned to duty from the squadron aid station.

(2) Unusual diseases. Malaria cases were limited to an average of three cases per month. Five cases of hepatitis were diagnosed and hospitalized but there still is doubt as to whether they were actual cases of hepatitis or just hemolytic reaction to secondary primaquine. Studies have been started in this respect by research teams in the field. A rash of acute gastroenteritis (amoebic) occurred in 3rd Squadron while on Operation JUNCTION CITY II. Prompt treatment and command emphasis on sanitary measures during operations in the field prevented any further cases. No cases were observed or reported during Operation MANHATTAN.

(3) MEDCAP. The MEDCAP program continued on a sporadic basis. 1565 patients were examined and treated. Most frequent diseases encountered were anemia URI - otic diseases (especially in children). A breakdown of patients treated by villages is listed below:

FEBRUARY

|           |                    |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Thpo Goap | 60 Treated         |
| Ap Hean   | 235 Treated        |
| Ap Hean   | 120 Treated        |
| Boa My    | <u>120 Treated</u> |
|           | 675 Treated        |

MARCH

|           |                    |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Cam My    | 225 Treated        |
| Cam Tam   | 100 Treated        |
| Chio Giao | 150 Treated        |
| Cam My    | <u>200 Treated</u> |
|           | 675 Treated        |

APRIL

|           |             |
|-----------|-------------|
| Sui Cat   | 60 Treated  |
| Ben Tranh | 350 Treated |

18

Page 15 of 18 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Ap Bo 100 Treated  
Thio Giao 200 Treated  
Suoi Cat 60 Treated  
770 Treated

20

(4) Evacuation and hospitalization.

(a) Type:

- 1 Disease - 91
- 2 Injury - 35
- 3 IRHA - 109

(b) Location:

- 1 93rd Evacuation Hospital - 121
- 2 3rd Field Hospital - 9
- 3 3rd Surgical Hospital - 7
- 4 24th Evacuation Hospital - 98

(c) Evacuation (transfers):

- 1 36th Evacuation Hospital - 31
- 2 6th Convalescence Hospital,  
Ccm Rahn Bay - 34
- 3 21st CSF TSN AFB (CONUS or  
Japan) - 78

8. (U) Psychological Operations and Civic Action.

a. The psychological warfare effort of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, during the period February thru April 1967, was supported by the 10th Mobile Field Team from the 246th Psychological Operations Company in the quarter, dropping 7,351,000 leaflets and broadcasting a total of eighty-nine hours. In addition, it produced forty-eight tapes for broadcast and distributed 62,000 leaflets. Activities during the quarter can be classified as coverage of the base camp area and support of combat operations (Operations JUNCTION CITY I and II, and MANHATTAN). A synopsis of the significant points of each operation follows:

(1) During the period 1 thru 17 February, the regiment continued support of the Joint Tet Campaign in LONG KHANH Province which was designed to encourage Viet Cong to rally during and after Tet. The Propaganda Team utilized the voices of recent ralliers to broadcast "Rally for Tet" messages to their former comrades. A series of leaflets including special Tet appeals and a letter from the province chief were dropped over all probable Viet Cong locations. The team also broadcast and dropped special 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment greetings to the people of LONG KHANH Province.

(2) During the same period as the Tet campaign, the team also provided tactical support for Operation MUNCIE during the period 4 thru 14 February. A series of eight missions were conducted, two of which featured broadcasts of the District Chief of DUC THANH to the people of his district under Viet Cong control. The team also broadcast the appeal of a rallier who defected with his wife to elements of the 3rd Squadron.

19

UNCLASSIFIED

2

(3) The period 18 February thru 15 March was devoted to support of Operation JUNCTION CITY I during which daily speaker missions were conducted over the entire regimental area of operation and new messages developed as the tactical and intelligence situations changed. Of interest were two missions run in reaction to contact made by the 1st Squadron. A night mission was flown announcing to the enemy unit below that a "Kill Zone" had been established around their positions. As a followup, the next morning rally messages were broadcast during lulls in the artillery fires.

(4) During the period 17 thru 31 March, the team provided loud-speaker and leaflet coverage of all probable enemy locations in the Blackhorse Base Camp area. Concurrently, ground speaker broadcasts were made along Highways 1 and 2, and in support of two MEDCAPS. Any information gleaned from recent rallies and individuals treated during the MEDCAPS was immediately capitalized upon by providing text material for future broadcasts and leaflets.

(5) From 1 thru 20 April, the team supported JUNCTION CITY II. During the operation intelligence and psychological warfare resources from the sub-sectors located in the area of operation, the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division were utilized as primary sources. Recent rallies to BEN CAT District were also exploited in the form of taped appeals and provided source material for future psychological operations in the area. The utilization of these local resources allowed for more current and specifically oriented activities.

(6) The period 21 thru 30 April was concerned principally with support of Operation MANHATTAN. Again the team covered the squadron AO's with loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets. The team also used loudspeaker broadcasts to assist in the evacuation of civilians by alerting them to the impending move prior to the arrival of US troops in their areas.

b. Civic Action during the quarter included numerous MEDCAPS, English language classes, evacuation and donation to the Vietnamese of large quantities of rice and other foodstuffs, evacuation of refugees and their possessions, and the continued cultivation of an effective system of coordination and communication between all the local agencies involved in civic action in the various locales in which the regiment operated.

(1) In February, regiment (S5) began an intensive program of counseling and assistance to the LONG KHANH Chieu Hoi Center at XUAN LOC in their self-help projects. Initially, at the request of the Hoi Chanh and their OCO advisors, emphasis was placed on improving the defenses of the center to an acceptable degree. Since they operate a very active and highly effective Armed Propaganda Platoon, the possibility of a Viet Cong attack on the center posed a real threat. During the month of February, in addition to providing advice, the Hoi Chanh were given sandbags, barbed wire, fence posts for fortifications, and scrap lumber for improvement of their living quarters. A broken water pump was also repaired at the center, which resulted in improving the health standards, and also enabled the Hoi Chanh to irrigate their crops. A total of 595 pounds of powdered milk, sixty gallons of cooking oil, and twenty bags of rice were donated to the 52nd Ranger Battalion to help the soldiers and their dependents enjoy the Tet holiday. A total of 535 patients were treated during the month as part of the MEDCAP program, and twenty were treated during DENTCAPS.

(2) During the month of March, the regiment continued to assist the LONG KHANH Chieu Hoi Center in self-help projects. The Hoi Chanh completed construction of a large defensive bunker which greatly increased the security of the center, and also completed a large, well-constructed pig pen for raising and breeding pigs. The project enabled them to broaden their vocational training to now include animal husbandry. The Hoi Chanh also started construction of furniture commercially. A total of 150 gallons of cooking oil, 1,309 pounds of powdered milk, and 1,700 pounds of rice were donated to needy families at CAM MY. English classes continued on a weekly basis, with an average attendance of twenty-five students per class. A total of 675 patients were treated on MEDCAPS.

(3) In April, the regiment participated in Operations JUNCTION CITY II and MANHATTAN. During this period, active civic action projects were accomplished in the base camp area as well as in the combat areas of operation. In the base camp area, the Blackhorse assisted in procuring seven pigs for the Chieu

20 9/15

Page 17 of 18 Pages

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22

Hoi Center, and continued to provide scrap lumber and tin for improvements in the Hoi Chanh living quarters. The Hoi Chanh also started construction of a new building, and will receive financial assistance from the regiment for the purchase of the wood needed for the project. During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, the regiment provided 6,500 pounds of rice to BEN CAT and CHANH THANH. The rice had been captured by the regiment and was badly needed due to the many refugees in this particular area. During Operation MANHATTAN, the regiment assisted in the evacuation of 315 refugees. A total of 337 bags of milled rice and 261 bags of paddy rice were given to the subsector advisor at DAU TIENG for use in assisting the refugees. A total of 850 patients were treated on MEDCAPS.

(4) During the quarter great care was taken to achieve a balance, wherever possible, between short term, high impact projects and more long range, far reaching projects aimed at helping the people become more self-sufficient, such as supporting vocational training for the Hoi Chanh. Close liaison and coordination continues to be maintained with both US and Vietnamese agencies involved in civic action activities. Among those are the sector advisory team, advisory personnel of 18th ARVN Division, subsector advisory personnel as well as the district chief, the S-5 of the 54th Artillery Group and the OCO and JUSPAO representatives. This coordination has helped bring about a freer exchange of information and ideas.

21 915

Page 18 of 18 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

23

OPERATIONAL REPORT  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD  
ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

SECTION II  
COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. OBSERVATIONS (Lessons Learned)

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1. (C) Operations.

a. Item: Employment of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP).

Discussion: The employment of the LRRP requires that certain assets of the regiment be made available to adequately support this type of operation. During hours of darkness, extraction of the LRRP is, under the best conditions, extremely difficult and hazardous. Terrain features (dense jungle and tall rubber trees) in many instances prohibit extraction by air. In order to adequately support this type of unit the following steps must be taken prior to each operation:

(1) Aircraft required to support the operation must be placed on immediate standby alert.

(2) Coordination must be affected with the ground reaction force as to location and movement of the patrol.

(3) Artillery concentrations plotted and at least two guns on target at all times.

Observation: Special techniques and requirements associated with LRRP operations should be a matter of SOP within the controlling headquarters.

b. Item: Clearing of open areas.

Discussion: During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, squadron elements encountered numerous mines on the edge of clearings. This was particularly true of jungle clearings that could be used as possible landing zones or fire support bases.

Observation: The periphery of jungle clearings should be checked and cleared of mines before entering.

2. (C) Logistics.

a. Item: Sealift of an armored cavalry squadron.

Discussion: One armored cavalry squadron complete with personnel and equipment can be moved from one location to another by sea utilizing five LST's and one AKA. Experience gained resulted from one squadron's recent movement north to participate in Operation OREGON.

Observation: Operational commitments and rapid shifting of units increases the need for each unit to maintain on file, the tonnage and vessel requirements necessary to move it by sea.

b. Item: Maintenance of equipment in sand/salt water environments.

Discussion: The combination of sand and salt water on all types of vehicles, in particular wheeled vehicles, will cause a great deal of wear on the suspension systems, power trains and under carriages. Particular emphasis must be placed on keeping air cleaners and filters clean. Drivers must also be taught the proper techniques for driving in the sand.

Observation: Vehicles and weapons must be carefully inspected, cleaned, and lubricated on a daily or at least a weekly basis to prevent deterioration of the vehicle. Driver indoctrination and training must be reemphasized to the operators concerning the new terrain they will be operating in.

c. Item: Liaison personnel at the port.

Discussion: During a sealift move it is highly beneficial for the unit being moved to establish a liaison man at the port to work with the port personnel.

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He is able to provide a focal point for communication between the two groups and is able to advise the parent unit on latest schedule and vessel changes.

Observation: Unit SOP's for sealift moves should provide for liaison personnel at the port.

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d. Item: Fuel Transfer Pumps.

Discussion: During Operation JUNCTION CITY II, it became necessary at times to supply a squadron by airlift. Fuel was lifted in 55 gallon drums, necessitating the use of hand operated fuel transfer pumps.

Observation: Each tracked vehicle has a need for a fuel transfer pump as part of its on equipment materiel (OEM).

e. Item: Communications required during aerial resupply operations.

Discussion: Communications between the landing and pickup zones and the aircraft are necessary for smooth and efficient operations. As a minimum three radio sets should be on the same frequency during the resupply operation. Ground signals such as smoke or panels will also facilitate the identification of landing and pickup areas.

Observation: A minimum of three radio sets supplemented with ground signals and panels are needed to provide adequate control of air-ground resupply operations.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

27  
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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 3 AUG 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:


a. Reference item concerning fuel transfer pumps, Section II, paragraph A2d, page 2: Concur. Unit should submit an EIR (Equipment Improvement Recommendation) IAW paragraph 3-7.4, TM 28-750. Provisions also exist for the Basic Issue Items List to be changed by submitting a change to the equipment TM.

b. Reference item concerning Section I, paragraph 4d(6), page 8 and paragraph 7b(5), page 14. Non-concur. The 11th ACR has been continuously supported by the 551st Light Maintenance Company. When the 188th Maintenance Battalion was activated the 551st was assigned to it, along with its NCR 500. When the 188th Maintenance Battalion deployed to Oregon, the NCR 500 accompanied the battalion, but the 551st Light Maintenance Company was reassigned to the 185th Maintenance Battalion and began manually posting the magnetic ledger cards. The 551st has been recommended for issue of another NCR 500 in Aug 67. On receipt, mechanized stock control will be resumed by this unit.

c. Reference item concerning flight facilities, page 9, paragraph d2: Engineer construction of airfield at Long Giao has now been completed. The aviation unit concerned is installing revetments for protection of aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER

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**E. L. KENNEDY**  
Cpt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
classified after 12 years  
DIR 5200.10 Applies

8-12

GPOP-DT(29 Jun 67) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
from HQ, 11th Armored Cav Regiment (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

15 SEP 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the  
report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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29  
OPERATIONAL REPORT  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD  
ENDING 30 APRIL 1967

SECTION III  
INCLOSURES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ROSTER OF COMMANDERS  
1 February 1967 - 30 April 1968

30

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Colonel William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Captain Marvin L. Egan

Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Major Francis E. Martin

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - Captain John E. Bailey

Troop A, 1st Squadron - Captain John F. Votaw

Troop B, 1st Squadron - Captain John R. Landry

Troop C, 1st Squadron - Captain Robert W. Garrett, Jr. (1 Feb - 16 Feb)  
Captain George L. Gunderman (16 Feb - )

Company D, 1st Squadron - Captain Craig L. Richardson (1 Feb - 28 Mar)  
Captain William C. Chadbourne (28 Mar - )

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron - Captain William K. Fraase (1 Feb - 1 Apr)  
1st Lieutenant Lawrence H. Marine Jr. (1 Apr - )

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Kibbey M. ...  
(1 Feb - 23 Feb) Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin F. Harmon III (3 Feb - )

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - Captain Bob E. Shambarger

Troop E, 2nd Squadron - Captain Richard M. Miller (1 Feb - 18 Feb) Captain Geoffrey S. ... (18 Feb - )

Troop F, 2nd Squadron - Captain Howard C. Batt (1 Feb - 31 Mar) Captain Donald A. Burns (1 Apr - )

Troop G, 2nd Squadron - Captain Fredric H. Fladd

Company H, 2nd Squadron - Captain John G. Russell

Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron - Captain William Perry (1 Feb - 31 Mar) Captain Shirley F. Hall (1 Apr - )

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Cochran

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - Captain Tedd A. Welsh  
(1 Feb - 1 Apr) Captain William F. Abernathy (1 Apr - )

Troop I, 3rd Squadron - Captain Joel R. Parker (1 Feb - 25 Mar) Captain Gilbert H. Payne (25 Mar - )

Troop K, 3rd Squadron - Captain Wayne P. Halstead (1 Feb - 1 Apr) 1st Lieutenant Charles K. Burr (1 Apr - 25 Apr) Captain Ronald A. Hofmann (25 Apr - )

Troop L, 3rd Squadron - Captain Larry L. Mengel (1 Feb - 18 Apr) Captain James G. Stephens (18 April - 28 April) Captain Harlen E. Gray (28 Apr - )


Company M, 3rd Squadron - Captain Herbert C. Hertel Jr. (1 Feb - 25 Mar) Captain Gerald C. Werner (25 March - )

Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron - Captain Leonard Deege

37th Medical Company - Captain Dennis J. Slade  
 919th Engineer Company (Armored) - Captain Donald J. Crocker  
 409th Radio Research Detachment - Captain Lee Contry  
 541st Military Intelligence Detachment - Major Cornelius L. Grey  
 33rd Chemical Detachment - Captain James T. Price  
 17th Public Information Detachment - Captain Owen W. Ditchfield  
 28th Military History Detachment - Major Bruce R. Ellson

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Incl 3  
Switchboard  
Diagram

